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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this study is to examine whether the use of money, social recognition, and feed-
back have a similar impact on employee performance in the context of a modern Korean broadband in-
ternet service firm. 
Design/methodology/approach – The study design was a quasi-field experiment (with control group). 
First, the leaders of this Korean firm were trained in behavioral performance management. Following the 
steps of organisational behavior modification (O.B. Mod.) they identified, measured, and analyzed criti-
cal performance behaviors and then intervened with the following reward incentives: money (n = 38), so-
cial recognition and caring attention (n = 41), and objective feedback only (n = 31). The main dependent 
variable was overall performance, and this was also broken down into quantity and quality dimensions. 
Findings – As hypothesized, money and social recognition had a significant impact on performance out-
comes, but feedback did not result in as strong a result. When compared to the control group (n = 23), all 
three reward incentives showed significantly more improvement of overall performance. These findings 
also indicated, as hypothesized, that the impact of this behavioral management approach on Korean em-
ployees did not appear as robust as previous meta-analytic research based on samples of US employees. 
Finally, although in the predicted direction, the hypothesis that social recognition would have a relatively 
stronger impact than money and feedback in this context was not statistically supported. 
Research limitations/implications – The major limitation concerns generalizability of the findings. How-
ever, the experimental design provides support for internal validity. 
Practical implications – The study results have practical implications for the value of behavioral perfor-
mance management, but also that cultural contingencies should also be considered for successful application. 
Originality/value – This study contributes preliminary evidence for O.B. Mod to have applicability across 
cultures. 
Keywords: Employee behavior, Performance management, Organizational behavior, Remuneration, Hu-
man resource management, South Korea 
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T raditionally, organizational development and performance management programs and ap-proaches have been researched and largely applied in one culture. However, in the global 
economy, these programs when now commonly taken to other cultures can no longer be assumed 
to work the same way, or at all. This new reality would seem to apply to all organizational de-
velopment programs, but especially behavioral performance management where cultural dimen-
sions would seem to play an important role. For example, how employees value and respond to 
the various (e.g. money, social recognition, and objective feedback) used in widely recognized be-
havioral performance management programs such as Luthans and colleagues’ organizational be-
havior modification (O.B. Mod.) approach (see Luthans and Kreitner, 1975, 1985; Luthans et al., 
1981; Luthans and Stajkovic, 1999; Peterson and Luthans, 2006; Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 
2001, 2003). In particular, there is both conceptual (Luthans et al., 1998) and empirical (Welsh 
et al., 1993) preliminary evidence that the O.B. Model may be affected by cultural dimensions for 
its effective application. 
Most theory and research over the years has generally concluded that to be effective, em-
ployee reward incentive systems in behavioral performance management need to be aligned 
with overall strategy (e.g. Arthur, 1994; Youndt et al., 1996). Once aligned, the evidence sug-
gests that these incentive systems will contribute to employee performance (e.g. see Delery, 
1998; Huselid, 1995; MacDuffie, 1995). However, behavioral performance management in gen-
eral and O.B. Mod. in particular have been shown to be successful in US firms (e.g. see meta-
analyses by Stajkovic and Luthans, 2003 for overall behavioral performance management and 
Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997 for O.B. Mod.). However, with only the exception of a study a num-
ber of years ago in Russia (Welsh et al., 1993), there have been no studies that have analyzed 
the relative impact of various reward incentives used in behavioral performance management 
in a very different culture such as Korea. Yet, as researchers and global managers seek to iden-
tify best practice approaches and apply them in organizations around the world, it seems im-
portant to explore whether generally accepted techniques in Western firms, such as behavioral 
performance management, will also be successful in other cultural contexts such as in Korean 
firms. To be effective in the new globalized environment, multi-national organizational leaders 
need to “pay attention to the variations across national borders and adjust to and manage these 
variations” (Punnett, 2004, p. 4; also see Adler, 2002) 
The purpose of this study is to test whether the widely recognized and researched behavioral 
performance management approach of organizational behavior modification or simply O.B. Mod. 
developed by Luthans and colleagues, and widely tested in the USA (e.g. see Luthans and Kreit-
ner, 1975, 1985; Luthans et al., 1981; Luthans and Stajkovic, 1999; Peterson and Luthans, 2006; 
Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 2001, 2003) can be successfully applied for performance impact in a 
cutting-edge Korean internet services firm with all Korean employees. Before presenting the study 
methods and results, a brief overview of both O.B. Mod. and the contrasting cultural dimensions 
between the US and South Korea (hereafter referred to as Korea) is presented in order to frame 
the study and derive hypotheses. 
The O.B. Mod. approach to performance management 
Developed over 30 years ago (Luthans and Kreitner, 1975) based on operant behaviorism and then 
expanded to include social learning and social cognitive theory (Luthans and Kreitner, 1985), or-
ganizational behavior modification, or simply referred to as O.B. Mod., follows five steps for be-
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havioral performance management. Very briefly, these include: 
(1) identify the critical performance behavior; 
(2) measure its frequency of occurrence; 
(3) analyze its antecedent cues and contingent consequences; 
(4) intervene with incentive motivators or reinforcers; and 
(5) evaluate the impact on performance. 
As with any problem solving model, the first step of this O.B. Mod. approach is to identify those 
critically important observable behaviors (e.g. making or selling a product or service) that have a 
significant impact on performance outcomes. The second step recognizes the importance of met-
rics – determine, either by directly counting or more often drawing from existing data, the fre-
quency the identified behavior is occurring under existing or baseline conditions. Often, this mea-
surement becomes the intervention, i.e. by merely measuring the critical behavior, performance 
improves. The third step is analytical. Both the antecedents that cue (not cause) the identified 
behavior, and the more important consequences (that the behavior depends upon), are identified 
in this functional or A (antecedent) – B (behavior) – C (consequence) analysis. If the “As” are not 
present (e.g. equipment, training, or expectations), then they must be taken care of to enhance 
the targeted behavior and resulting performance. Most often, however, these antecedent cues are 
not the problem. Rather, contingent reinforcing consequences are weak or missing from the crit-
ical performance-related behaviors. For example, with the exception of sales commissions and a 
few pay for performance plans, most organizational reward systems only reinforce retention (i.e. 
paying by the week or month keeps employees on the job), but does not pay employees for day-to-
day behaviors that are crucial to the quantity or quality of productivity and service performance. 
Thus, the fourth step of O.B. Mod., the action step, is to train supervisors and managers to con-
tingently administer reinforcers such as money, social recognition and feedback for the specific 
behaviors that have been identified, measured, and analyzed in the preceding steps of O.B. Mod. 
The final step is then to make sure that this O.B.Mod. process is indeed having the intended im-
pact on performance improvement, and if it is not, then the steps need to be repeated. 
Although this O.B. Mod. approach has been clearly demonstrated through the years to have a 
significant positive impact on performance outcomes with US employees (see the meta-analyses 
by Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 2003), with the exception of the study that successfully tested the 
positive impact of O.B. Mod. in a Russian factory 15 years ago (Welsh et al., 1993), the question 
remains whether O.B. Mod. and its reward incentives of money, recognition and feedback holds 
in other cultural contexts, specifically in a modern Korean firm. 
The possible impact of cultural values 
This study was conducted in Korea because of its growing importance in the global economy 
(Steers, 1999) and in this particular firm because it is part of the high interest, world leading Ko-
rean broadband internet industry (Fortune, 2004). Also, this study was conducted here because, 
along with other Asian countries, Korea has been recognized to have very contrasting cultural val-
ues with Western countries, and the US in particular (Hofstede, 2001; Trompenaars and Hamp-
den-Turner, 1998). 
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Cultural variations may help explain why some replications of organization development 
studies in other regions of the world are successful and others are not. The two most widely 
recognized classifications of cultural dimensions are drawn from separate large-scale studies 
by the well known Dutch researchers Geert Hofstede and Fons Trompenaars. In particular, 
Hofstede (1980, 2001) originally developed the now widely recognized four cultural dimensions 
of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity. Although there are 
more recent classifications of cultural dimensions (e.g. see the GLOBE project, House et al., 
2004), they still largely depend on Hofstede’s original dimensions as we do here in describ-
ing the general cultural context for Korean employees and how it compares to Western cul-
tural dimensions. 
Power distance and incentives 
Power distance is regarded as an important dimension to determine the nature of a given cul-
ture. For example, if a cultural context is high on power distance, then there is a perceived un-
equal relationship between those with power and those without. It would follow that because 
employees from high power distance cultures would tend to recognize the power that their orga-
nizational leaders have on their work and even personal lives, they would be motivated by ways 
to get close to them. On the other hand, in cultures with low power distance, with relative equal-
ity for all, organizational leaders do not have automatic authority to influence their employees. It 
should follow that employees in high power distance cultures may respond better to non-financial 
(i.e. more socially determined by the leader) incentives such as social recognition. By the same to-
ken, those in low power distance cultures may respond better to more objective and economically 
determined financial incentives. 
According to Hofstede (2001), Korea is classified as a high power distance culture, and by con-
trast the US is a very low power distance culture. Therefore, Korean employees may be inclined 
to find ways to get close to their leaders who have controlling influence. In other words, the incen-
tive of social recognition may be motivating to Korean employees when administered by organi-
zational leaders who have a close relationship with and respect of their employees. Objective fi-
nancial incentives, on the other hand, may be more compatible with low power distance cultures 
such as found in the US. This would suggest that Korean employees that would tend to have high 
power distance cultural values may be more influenced by non-financial rewards such as social 
recognition. By contrast, American workers, that would tend to have low power distance cultural 
values, may be more likely to respond favorably to monetary incentives. 
Individualism vs. collectivism and incentives 
Another of Hofstede’s best known cultural dimensions is individualism vs. collectivism. Since 
all the incentives in this study are designed by the O.B. Mod. behavioral performance manage-
ment approach to be contingent on individual employee performance, it is likely that the impact 
would be greater in individualistic than in collectivistic cultures. This is because in collectivistic 
cultures, teamwork and group harmony are strongly emphasized over individual concerns. Em-
ployees with collectivist cultural values would likely better respond to incentives that would be 
most helpful to the work group as a whole (e.g. gain-sharing) or less harmful for teamwork. All 
the incentives tested in this study are contingent on individual performance and thus may not be 
as effective in collectivist cultures as in individualistic cultures. 
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In a strong collectivistic culture, such as Hofstede says is the case in Korea, there is a higher 
value placed on preserving group wellbeing. Incentives that are less detrimental to this value 
would have more of an impact. Social recognition and performance feedback are not as prominent 
as monetary rewards in emphasizing individual achievement over other members and are less det-
rimental to group harmony than monetary rewards. Therefore, the social recognition and perfor-
mance feedback may be more compatible and have a bigger positive impact on collectivistically-
oriented Korean employees than would monetary incentives, especially when compared to more 
individualistically-oriented US employees. 
Masculinity and incentives 
Another relevant cultural dimension identified by Hofstede for this study is masculinity. This 
dimension has much in common with the dimension of individualism and collectivism in terms 
of its role of affecting incentive preferences of employees. In particular, low-level masculine val-
ues are more related to collectivism than individualism. According to Hofstede, countries clas-
sified as collectivistic would tend to be low on masculinity, whereas those with individualistic 
characteristics would be more likely to have high masculine values. 
According to Hofstede, Korean cultural values would tend to be low on masculinity, i.e. they 
would show a preference for relationships, modesty, caring for the disadvantaged, and the im-
portance of quality of life. In contrast, those in the US would tend to have masculine values re-
lated to ego goals, careers and material things. Thus, this masculinity cultural context could 
suggest the same as for individualism vs. collectivism, i.e. Korean employees will respond more 
to the non-financial than the financial incentives in a performance management program such 
as O.B. Mod. 
Other relevant cultural dimensions
In addition to Hofstede’s traditionally recognized cultural dimensions, Trompenaars (1994; 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1998) has identified three additional cultural dimensions 
that are relevant to this study. These are identified as universalism-particularism, specific-dif-
fuse, and achievement-ascription cultural dimensions. 
Universalism vs. particularism 
A universalist, or rule-based, culture promotes equality in the sense that all persons falling 
under the rule should be treated the same. In a universalist culture, there is a tendency to re-
sist exceptions that might weaken the rule. By contrast, in a particularist culture, the excep-
tional nature of present circumstances is emphasized. In a particularist culture, there is a 
tendency to protect the person and a relationship no matter what the rules say. On this di-
mension, Trompenaars classifies those in the USA tend to have universalistic cultural values, 
whereas Koreans would tend to have particularistic cultural values (Trompenaars and Hamp-
den-Turner, 1998). 
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This cultural dimension may impact the effective use of various incentives. For example, those 
with particularist cultural values such as Koreans would tend to seek gratification through rela-
tionships, while those with universalist cultural values such as those from the USA would be more 
likely to follow the rules and policies and expect to receive tangible rewards for doing so. This sug-
gests that incentives that can maximize the value of relationships (e.g. social recognition) may be 
more effective for employees in particularistic cultures such as Korea, whereas monetary rewards 
that can be clearly given for following the rules and meeting agreed upon expectations and goals 
will be more effective for employees in universalistic cultures such as the USA. 
Specific vs. diffuse 
Still another dimension that differentiates cultures is based on the degree to which people engage 
in specific areas of life or diffusely in multiple areas. In “specific cultures”, work and private life 
are sharply separated. However, in “diffuse cultures”, everything and everybody is connected to 
everything and everybody. Specific and diffuse cultures are sometimes called low and high con-
text (Kim et al., 1998), and is related to how much you have to know before effective communica-
tion can occur. 
According to this dimension, Trompenaars (1994) classifies the US as tending to have a 
strong specific culture and Korea to have a strong diffuse culture. In other words, Korean em-
ployees may be more likely to be influenced by incentives that provide more social relation-
ships and quality of life impact, while American employees will be more likely to be influenced 
by rewards that provide more specific and direct benefits. Of the three incentives used in this 
study’s O.B. Mod. application of behavioral performance management, social recognition would 
have the most powerful social relationship and personal impact. In other words, social recog-
nition would seem to have a more significant impact on performance for the diffuse Korean 
employees, whereas money would have more impact on American employees tending to have 
strong specific cultural values. 
Achievement vs. ascription 6
Finally, in ascriptive cultures such as Korea (Trompenaars, 1994), people are judged by status, au-
thority, and position, and people with higher status or rank are supposed to have higher respon-
sibilities and rights regardless of their individual achievements. It follows in such ascriptive cul-
tures that pay-for-performance incentives for high producing employees may not be as effective. 
Conversely, in achievement-oriented cultures such as the USA (Trompenaars, 1994), incentives 
contingent on individual performance would be predicted to be more effective. This would suggest 
that contingent pay in particular, and the overall effect of incentives in general, for Korean em-
ployees tending to have ascriptive cultural values may not be as strong as that for American em-
ployees with strong achievement-oriented cultural values. 
This difference between an ascriptive cultural context and an achievement-oriented one may 
influence the impact of each incentive used in this study. The fact that status and position are 
more valued by ascriptive cultures implies that instead of pragmatic rewards for their achieve-
ments, more indirect honorary rewards for seniority and respect may be more impactful. Getting 
social recognition from their organizational leader would not be as pragmatic as getting mone-
tary rewards since recognition is based more on honorary respect for accomplishing something. 
The social meaning and importance of honor and respect in an ascriptive culture would tend to 
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be more valued. Therefore, from this perspective of an ascriptive culture such as found in Ko-
rea, social recognition may be more impactful than other forms of incentives such as money or 
feedback. 
Study hypotheses derived from the cultural context 
Importantly, the above discussion is not intended to be a comprehensive summary of research 
on cultural differences between the USA and Korea or to determine the precise cultural context 
for this study. Rather, the purpose of the above discussion of cultural dimensions is to simply 
highlight some of the traditionally recognized cultural values of Korean employees in general, 
especially in comparison with American employees, in assessing the possible impact of reward 
incentives used in this study of an O.B. Mod. application in Korea. In other words, this very 
brief overview simply serves as the framing and point of departure for hypotheses to be tested in 
this Korean field experiment. Specifically, with the contrasting cultural differences between the 
USA and Korea on power distance, collectivism, masculinity, particularism, diffuse characteris-
tics and ascription influence, and using the considerable US-based research results on incentive 
motivators in behavioral performance management in general (Stajkovic and Luthans, 2003) 
and O.B. Mod. in particular (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997), serving as a descriptive comparison 
(not a cross-cultural analysis study), we derive the following hypotheses: 
 H1. Using the five step O.B. Mod. behavioral performance management approach, each of 
the reward incentives of money, social recognition and objective feedback will have a posi-
tive impact on this sample of Korean employees’ performance outcomes. 
 H2. The reward incentives of money, social recognition and objective feedback will have rel-
atively less performance impact on this Korean sample than has generally been found in US 
samples. 
 H3. The reward incentive of social recognition will have a relatively greater impact on this 
sample of Korean employees’ performance outcomes than will either the incentives of money 
or objective feedback. 
Study methodology 
This study used a quasi-field experiment (with control group) design (Cook and Campbell, 1979). 
Random assignment of individual participants to the three experimental groups and the control 
group was not possible, but random assignment of the three types of experimental interventions 
(i.e. money, social recognition and feedback) and the control was done and measures were taken 
before and after the intervention in the experimental groups and the control group. 
Study site and procedures 
The main business of this modern Korean organization used in this study is to provide broad-
band internet access service to residential subscribers and also enterprise network and data 
communication services. The sample groups for the experiment were chosen from the divisions 
whose main functions are to maintain and serve current customers and recruit new customers. 
The facilities for the divisions are located in four buildings in three large Korean cities. 
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Competition in this business is very intense and its success depends on the number of subscrib-
ers to the service provided. Hence, the study organization is proactively trying to find new ways 
to increase the capability of its service workers to provide quality service to the existing custom-
ers as well as recruiting new customers. This company’s leadership was open to the objectives of 
this study to test different types of contingently administered reward incentives in order to im-
prove service performance outcomes. 
This organization uses very detailed and systematic criteria to evaluate employee performance 
in both quality and quantity of service. Productivity is measured at the division, team, and in-
dividual level. Important to this study is the fact that service performance data is obtained at 
the individual employee level on a weekly basis tracked by employee number. This is accom-
plished by the performance monitoring division located at a different site combined with direct 
supervisors working at the same facilities as the service employees. This combination of the out-
side monitoring function and the direct supervisor input yield the final individual level perfor-
mance measure. Specifically, performance points for each employee are based on both service 
quality and the number of calls handled. Service quality had a 70 percent weight and number 
of calls made up 30 percent of the final performance points. This pre-intervention archivally-de-
rived individual level performance data was averaged for each study participant over the pre-
vious two months. 
The three experimental and control groups created for the study were at four different loca-
tions in three cities as follows: 
(1) monetary incentive experimental group (n = 38); 
(2) social recognition and attention experimental group (n = 41); 
(3) objective feedback only experimental group (n = 31); and 
(4) the control group (n = 23). 
Demographically, the majority of the employees for all four groups were relatively young females 
– which is typical of this type of Korean organization, but they had considerable experience being 
on average on the job for several years. The type of work and skill level of these employees and 
the company policies and upper management were equivalent for all groups. The type of reward 
incentive is the independent variable and the overall, quality, and quantity individual level per-
formance outcomes are the dependent variables. The direct supervisors and team leaders (here-
after referred to as leaders) in all three experimental groups received systematic O.B. Mod. be-
havioral performance management training (the details presented next) before the three types of 
reward incentive interventions were implemented. Those supervisors and team leaders of the con-
trol group received an information meeting about some company matters. 
O.B. Mod. behavioral performance management training 
The direct leaders of the employees in each intervention group were given comprehensive training 
on the five-step application of the O.B. Mod. model of behavioral performance management pre-
sented in the introductory section (see Luthans and Kreitner, 1975, 1985; Luthans and Stajkovic, 
1999). Specifically, these leaders learned to: 
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(1) identify; 
(2) measure; 
(3) functionally analyze antecedents and consequences; 
(4) contingently apply the designated incentive (i.e. either money, objective feedback, or 
social recognition); and 
(5) evaluate impact on performance outcomes. 
Each group of leaders received in a workshop format an identical, except for the type of incentive 
intervention they were to use (i.e. money, social recognition or performance feedback), three hour 
O.B. Mod. training session conducted by the same Korean researcher. 
After being given a brief background on the principles and overall approach of behavioral 
performance management, the leaders were specifically trained in the steps of O.B. Mod. as 
follows: 
(1) the leaders were first asked to identify critical, observable, and measurable behaviors 
that could have a high impact on improving their employees’ performance; 
(2) the leaders were then asked how they were going to measure these identified behaviors; 
(3) the leaders were then trained in identifying the antecedents and consequences of the 
identified performance behaviors; and 
(4) after identifying, measuring, and analyzing the key performance behaviors, the leaders 
were trained on administering the intervention step which, as said earlier, is the action 
step in O.B. Mod. and was the treatment manipulation in this study. 
Each group of leaders was separately trained in and asked to implement a different reward in-
centive intervention (i.e. money, social recognition, or objective feedback) to manage the identi-
fied critical performance behaviors. More specifically, the study interventions were operational-
ized as follows: 
(1) Monetary reward incentive group. For the purposes of the study, the Korean researcher, 
in conjunction with management, developed a monetary incentive system. Using the base-
line two months’ average performance for each employee, there was a payout of 10 per-
cent of the weekly payment for each 10 percent increase in performance. Thus, if an em-
ployee historically produced at the level of 500 calls a week in the baseline period and 
after the intervention produces at a rate of 550, he or she received an extra 10 percent in-
crease in pay. Thus, this intervention allowed each individual to be judged on his or her 
performance only, which reduced the amount of peer pressure experienced by other indi-
viduals in the work group. 
The trained leaders in this group carefully communicated at the beginning of the month, 
and then continuously throughout the month, to their individual employees that the mone-
tary contingency consequence would be forthcoming when they concentrated on exhibiting 
the critical performance behaviors identified in step 1 of the O.B. Mod. training. Employees 
were also provided with ongoing assistance if they needed further clarification regarding 
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the specifics of the program. The on-site Korean researcher randomly verified throughout 
the month long intervention period that the leaders did indeed clearly point out the types 
of behaviors that would increase employees’ performance and that this would result in the 
monetary benefit to them. He also randomly checked with individual employees that they 
indeed did understand what the targeted behaviors were and the payout they would receive 
for exhibiting them. 
(2) Social recognition and caring attention group. In this intervention, the O.B. Mod. trained 
leaders proactively administered personal recognition and caring, positive attention con-
tingent on observing their employees performing the specific behaviors identified in step 
1 of the O.B. Mod. approach. Because of the problems with giving consistent, effective 
social recognition, the leaders had to learn through training the manner by which pos-
itive, genuine recognition should be given. For example, this group of leaders were ex-
plicitly trained to administer social recognition and attention in such a way that it was 
not false or sugary praise or a simple “pat on the back”. Instead, these leaders were to 
notice and be genuinely appreciative when employees were doing the behaviors commu-
nicated to be important to their performance. For instance, the leaders were instructed 
to say things such as, “I was monitoring and I noticed that when you’re helping custom-
ers, the way you talk, and even your tone of voice, was very kind and empathetic. You 
also provided considerable detailed and accurate information. That’s exactly what we 
expect from our service team and I really appreciate your talent and hard work.” Again, 
the on-site Korean researcher randomly verified from both the leaders and the employ-
ees throughout the intervention that these social recognition interactions were indeed 
taking place. 
(3) Objective feedback only group. In this final intervention the leaders were trained how to 
develop charts/graphs and other written and verbal objective information concerning the 
frequency of the identified critical performance behaviors. Unlike the social recognition in-
tervention, this feedback intervention carefully focused on providing objective information 
displayed in charts/graphs and reports whenever possible on how the employee was doing. 
They were instructed not to give just caring, positive attention as in the case of the social 
recognition intervention, but they were told to use a positive approach in providing and ex-
plaining the objective data and to use the guideline represented by the acronym PIGS (pos-
itive, immediate, graphic, and specific) in administering this feedback intervention. During 
the training for this intervention, the leader was responsible for not only identifying behav-
iors specific to the employee performance, but also behaviors that could be objectively mea-
sured and its frequency graphed. The administration of the intervention thus allowed the 
leader to graphically present feedback to the employee on a private, individual basis. As with 
the other two interventions, the on-site Korean researcher randomly verified with both the 
leaders and the employees that this objective feedback was indeed being contingently pro-
vided in this prescribed manner. 
These follow-ups for each intervention served as a type of manipulation check for the study. 
Specifically, after all three training sessions, the Korean researcher/trainer contacted randomly 
throughout the month of the intervention the target leaders and employees in person, by e-mail, 
or by phone. The researcher asked the leaders whether they were correctly implementing their 
specific intervention and how they were doing it. This manipulation check revealed that the lead-
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ers remembered and were on-track to correctly (and corrected if not) implement the training they 
had received. The same for the employees, they understood the behaviors that were being targeted 
and for the most part correctly identified the type of consequence that would be forthcoming (i.e. 
money, recognition, or feedback). 
Data analysis 
The primary tool for analysis consisted of ANOVA, t-tests, and post-hoc pair-wise comparison 
tests. Paired sample t-tests were used to compare the baseline two months performance with the 
post-intervention one-month performance within each group. Between-group t-tests and one-way 
ANOVA were used to test between-group differences in effect magnitudes among systematically 
administered incentives of money, recognition, and performance feedback. A post-hoc pair-wise 
comparison test was used as a follow-up after ANOVA. Since work performance contained two 
measures (service quality and number of calls), follow-up analysis was also done with each type of 
work performance outcome as a follow-up to the statistical analysis of the overall, combined per-
formance outcome. 
Results 
To test the hypotheses, Table I shows that both money and social recognition incentives signif-
icantly improved total performance (overall performance improvement: 3.01 percent for money, 
p = 0.01 and 6.31 percent for recognition, p = 0.008), but although performance improvement 
from the feedback incentive was in the right direction, it was only marginally significant (over-
Table I. Impact of incentives on performance outcomes 
   Performance  Performance
Performance    Baseline after improvement     Level of 
outcomes Incentives  performance  intervention  (%) t-value significance 
 
Overall performance  Money  24.5068  25.2447  3.01  2.731 0.010 *** 
 Recognition  17.3741 18.4707  6.31  2.809  0.008 ***
  Feedback  25.7855  26.2506  1.8 1.760  0.089 * 
 Control  20.0848  19.5245  –2.79  –1.264  0.219 
Service quality  Money  28.7053  29.6579  3.31  2.533  0.016 ** 
 Recognition  17.0537 18.1707  6.55  1.999  0.050 ** 
 Feedback  28.1129  28.2935  0.6  0.470  0.642 
 Control  19.6739  19.0957  –2.93  –1.104  0.282 
Service quantity  Money  14.7105  14.9474  1.6  0.988  0.33
 Recognition  18.1220  19.1707 5.79  2.202  0.033 ** 
 Feedback  20.3548  21.4839  5.54  2.584 0.015 ** 
 Control  21.0435  20.5217  –2.48  0.566  0.577
* p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01 
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all performance improvement = 1.8 percent, p = 0.089). Breaking down into the type of perfor-
mance, Table I indicates that money and social recognition had a significant impact on the im-
provement of the service quality measure (3.31 percent for money, p = 0.016, and 6.55 percent for 
recognition, p = 0.05). Feedback, however, was not a significant reward incentive for increasing 
service quality (0.6 percent performance improvement, p = 0.642). When quantity or the num-
ber of calls was used as the performance outcome (see Table I), social recognition and feedback 
were significant contributors to the improvement of the quantity of performance (social recog-
nition: 5.79 percent, p = 0.033, and feedback: 5.54 percent, p = 0.015), but although the impact 
of money on the quantity of performance was in the right direction, it was not significant at 1.6 
percent ( p = 0.33). 
Overall, when the impact of the O.B. Mod. behavioral management approach on performance 
improvement was assessed, recognition was found to be a strong incentive for these Korean service 
workers in both quality and quantity. Money and feedback were partially significant in improv-
ing performance. When compared to the control group, as shown in Table II, all three experimen-
tal groups showed significant overall performance improvements over the control group (money: t 
= 2.655, p = 0.01; recognition: t = 2.680, p = 0.009; and feedback: t = 2.096; p = 0.041). 
Table II also indicates the results of the effect of the reward incentives on service quality perfor-
mance compared to the control group. The money and recognition groups showed significant qual-
ity performance improvement over the control group (t = 2.422 and 2.008 respectively; p , 0.05). 
The feedback group, however, did not show a significant improvement on the service quality mea-
sure over the control group (t = 1.197; p = 0.237). 
As shown in Table II, when the number of calls was used as the quantity performance mea-
sure, no groups showed strong improvements over the control group (i.e. there was only mar-
ginal p < 0.10 statistical significance between both recognition and feedback and the control 
group and no significant difference between money and the control group). Overall, however, 
H1 that the incentives of money, social recognition and performance feedback when adminis-
tered through leaders trained in the O.B. Mod. model of behavioral performance management 
would have a positive impact on the performance of Korean service workers in this firm was 
generally supported.
Table II. Incentive interventions vs. control group performance outcomes 
Performance standards  Comparison  t  df  p 
Overall performance  Money vs. control  2.655  59  0.010 *** 
 Recognition vs. control  2.680 62  0.009 *** 
 Feedback vs. control  2.096  52  0.041 ** 
Service quality  Money vs. control  2.422  59  0.019 ** 
 Recognition vs. control  2.008  62  0.049 **
 Feedback vs. control  1.197  52  0.237 
Service quantity  Money vs. control  0.976  59  0.333 
 Recognition vs. control  1.677 62  0.099 * 
 Feedback vs. control  1.755  52  0.085 * 
* p < 0.10 ; ** p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.01
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 H2 was derived in order to explore the possible relative difference in magnitude of the various 
incentives on the performance of this sample of Korean service workers versus previous research 
using US employees. To begin to test this hypothesis we simply compared this study’s results with 
recent findings of same procedure studies using US employees (see Peterson and Luthans, 2006; 
Stajkovic and Luthans, 2001). In the most closely replicated Stajkovic and Luthans (2001) study, 
but importantly not intended to be a systematic cross-cultural analysis, the performance improve-
ment using the same incentives and O.B. Mod. procedures with an American sample of employees 
was considerably higher than was found in this Korean study. 
The same type of differential results were found for another study that followed the same re-
ward incentives and O.B. Mod. procedures for a sample of American service employees (Peterson 
and Luthans, 2006). Meta-analyses of the impact of behavioral management on the performance 
of US employees also indicate on average stronger results (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 2003). 
Again, although the present study was not specifically designed to be a cross-cultural study of be-
havioral performance management between US and Korea employees, the procedures were the 
same between the two earlier studies (and generally those in the meta-analyses) and this study, 
and the more robust impact on the average performance improvement of the American samples 
over this Korean sample does provide some beginning support for  H2. However, no definitive con-
clusions can be drawn and this post hoc descriptive analysis for testing  H2 should be considered 
only exploratory. 
To test  H3 on the relative effects of the three reward incentives, analysis of variance of change 
in performance between baseline and post intervention was conducted by comparing group aver-
age scores of the three incentive groups. When the overall performance score was used as the de-
pendent variable, Table III shows there was no significant main effect. Thus, statistically there 
are no significant differences in performance improvement among the three treatment groups. 
To investigate this result further, follow-up tests were done with the quality and quantity per-
formance measures that comprise the overall performance score. When service quality was used 
as the performance outcome, no significant effect differences among the four groups were found 
(Table III; F = 1.066, p = 0.348). When number of calls was used as the quantity performance 
outcome, again no significant effect differences among the four groups were found (Table III; F 
= 1.523, p = 0.223). Tables I, II, and III do show consistent results that regardless of the type 
Table III. ANOVA for change in performance outcomes 
Performance standards Source  Sum of squares  df  Mean squares  F  p 
Overall performance  Between groups  7.226  2  3.613  0.926  0.399 
 Within groups  417.573  107  3.903 
 Total  424.799  109 
Service quality  Between groups  16.897  2  8.449  1.066  .348 
 Within groups  848.141  107  7.927 
 Total  865.038  109 
Service quantity  Between groups  17.936  2 8.968  1.523  0.223 
 Within groups  630.255  107  5.890 
 Total  648.291  109 
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of performance measure used, social recognition has the relatively largest impact, followed by 
money and then feedback. However, since there is no statistical significance on these relative 
differences,  H3 is not supported. 
Discussion 
When widely recognized reward incentives were systematically administered through leaders 
trained in the O.B. Mod. behavioral performance management approach in a Korean internet ser-
vice firm, money and social recognition had significant impacts on performance outcomes. Feed-
back, however, did not result in as significant an improvement in performance. This may be be-
cause money was perceived as having a high instrumental value that stimulated extra effort to 
improve performance. In terms of social recognition, it may be that the more the employees re-
ceived it, the more they assumed it would lead to tangible outcomes and, based on the cultural 
overview of Korea, seems to fit the values of Koreans. The reason feedback did not have as much 
impact on performance as money or social recognition may be because the tasks for this particu-
lar service setting were fairly routine and simple, and thus the feedback intervention was not as 
meaningful and culturally compatible to these employees. 
Although the study’s major hypothesis that the reward incentives of money, social recognition 
and feedback administered through trained leaders in the O.B. Mod. approach to behavioral man-
agement would positively impact performance was supported, the most interesting implications 
revolve around the use of social recognition in this cultural context. Specifically, that social rec-
ognition was consistently higher than money in this Korean setting runs counter to conventional 
wisdom in the West and differs somewhat from what has been found with meta-analyses of be-
havioral performance management studies using US employees (Stajkovic and Luthans, 1997, 
2003). As suggested in the introductory discussion of cultural dimensions in Korea and the USA, 
the differences between the two countries may help explain this finding. As was found in Hofst-
ede’s cultural dimensions, Korea is classified as one of the extreme countries in high power dis-
tance and collectivism. Therefore, these cultural values suggest Koreans may be more motivated 
by the incentives that provide a better chance to form a close relationship with their leaders and 
that preserve teamwork and group harmony. These Korean cultural characteristics may be why 
social recognition may be a relatively more effective incentive in Korea and other Asian countries 
with similar cultural values. 
Trompenaars’ cultural dimensions may also provide an explanation of the potential power of so-
cial recognition as an effective incentive in Korea. He identifies Korea as having a strong partic-
ularistic, diffuse, and ascriptive culture, which seeks gratification through relationships, values 
group efforts over individual performance, prefers more comprehensive benefits, and values honor-
ary rewards of status and position over pragmatic rewards. These Korean cultural characteristics 
provide support for social recognition as an effective incentive. Even though  H3 was not statis-
tically supported, as in the USA, social recognition may be an overlooked, but potentially power-
ful incentive to improve Korean human resource performance. However, it should be emphasized 
once again that this study provides only exploratory, preliminary findings, and definitive conclu-
sions will have to be demonstrated by further research. 
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Study limitations and strengths 
As with most field experiments, this study has limitations and strengths that need to be ac-
knowledged when interpreting the results. These can be classified into external and internal va-
lidity issues. Since this study was conducted in a very specific service setting (a Korean broad-
band internet service provider) it is somewhat unique and limits the generalizability of the 
findings. Also, since the workforce in this firm was relatively young and had a majority of fe-
males, the generalizability is again limited. On a positive note, however, this firm does repre-
sent the new Korean firms that are competing in the booming high-tech, information economy 
that is sweeping Korea and may be a prototype for generalizing to the new generation of firms 
in the rest of the world. 
As to internal validity, a strength of the study was that hard measures of performance at 
the individual level were used instead of the typical perceptual measures from either self or 
supervisors. Although randomization of groups rather than individuals was only possible, the 
recognized threats to internal validity were minimized in this quasi-experimental, with con-
trol group design. Specifically, mortality was not an issue because no one left the organization 
during this study. Maturation was not a problem because all participants in the study had rel-
atively similar experiences within each group and were only engaged in a one-month interven-
tion period. Diffusion of treatments, where group members will communicate to obtain impor-
tant information, was also unlikely because of the different geographical locations of the four 
groups. The same was true of resentful demoralization. This threat was minimal since each 
intervention group and the control group was generally located in different cities and report-
edly did not have any communication with each other during the duration of the study. Fi-
nally, the instrumentation threat was minimal since the same measures pre and post inter-
vention were used for all groups. In total, although there are external validity issues with this 
study, and the cultural values of the participants were not directly measured and systematic 
cross-cultural analysis with US samples is still needed for future research, the criteria for in-
ternal validity were largely met. 
Conclusion 
With the reality of the global economy, more attention must be devoted to leadership and 
organization development across cultures. Too often, both scholars and practitioners have as-
sumed universalist development approaches and have simply applied them as “plug and play” 
across organizations, strategies, and even cultures. A case in point is widely recognized behav-
ioral performance management programs. Research results, using US samples and a strong 
framework of reinforcement theory and convergence with a few international studies (e.g. Welsh 
et al., 1993), suggest that the O.B. Mod behavioral performance management technique may 
be applicable in other cultures. However, this study found cultural nuances may influence the 
extent to which each type of reward incentive impacted these Korean employees’ performance. 
While this study contributes preliminary evidence for O.B. Mod to have applicability across cul-
tures, the effectiveness of various reward incentives and the impact on outcomes may be some-
what different across cultures. Thus, those advocating O.B. Mod as a best practice for perfor-
mance management must recognize the possible differential impact that may be driven by the 
cultural context of the application. 
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Similar to other organization development techniques and approaches, behavioral performance 
management in general, and O.B. Mod. in particular, and the reward incentives of money, social 
recognition, and feedback, have been largely researched and applied in US settings. This study 
found that the use of money, social recognition, and feedback incentives administered through 
the O.B. Mod. approach did have a generally positive impact on the performance outcomes of Ko-
rean service workers in an internet provider firm. However, the performance impact found in this 
study was not as robust as has been found in previous similar US studies or the average results 
of US-based meta-analytic studies. Although not directly tested, the generally recognized cultural 
differences between the USA and Korea may help explain this finding of the study. Even though 
in the hypothesized direction, this study did not statistically demonstrate that more culturally 
compatible social recognition had a greater relative impact on these Korean workers than money 
or feedback. However, as a practical implication for the research and practice of organization de-
velopment, this study does demonstrate the value of approaches such as O.B. Mod., but also once 
again indicates that cultural contingencies must be considered in order to successfully apply largely 
Western-based techniques and approaches in different cultures. 
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